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We propose a quantum communication protocol that can be used to transmit any quantum
state, one party to another via several intermediate nodes, securely on quantum communication
network. The scheme makes use of the sequentially chained and approximate version of private
quantum channels satisfying certain commutation relation of n-qubit Pauli operations. In this
paper, we study the sequential structure, security analysis, and efficiency of the quantum sequential
transmission (QST) protocol in depth.
PACS numbers: 03.67.-a, 03.67.Dd, 03.67.Hk
I. INTRODUCTION
One of the most popular quantum cryptographic prim-
itives, except quantum key distribution, is the quan-
tum secret sharing (QSS) protocols [1, 2]. The primitive
known as QSS is a process of splitting a piece of quantum
information into several parts, and then securely recon-
structing the information, but certain subparts are not
enough to restore the original quantum information. (In
a strict sense, the secret sharing is different from the state
sharing on its goal [3], but we treat the protocols as in
the same category.) There are huge number of theoreti-
cal studies on QSS protocols, and also exist experimental
demonstrations on QSS schemes in continuous-variable
regime, e.g., Ref. [4, 5].
Transmission or distribution of quantum information
over several authorized nodes is essential for future ap-
plications in quantum communications. We here review
the original QSS scheme from the point of view of (ap-
proximate) private quantum channels (PQC), and then
propose an information transmission method, namely, ε-
secure quantum sequential transmission (QST) protocol.
This protocol uses a concept of private quantum channel
and aims to secure sequential transmission, where arbi-
trary quantum states pass through several authorized in-
termediate nodes (or participants). In the transmission
process, all nodes must collaborate to reveal the orig-
inal quantum information. In the sequentially chained
scheme, we exploit the Pauli commutation relations on
n-qubit quantum states, and derive the mathematical
structure of multi-node ε-randomizing maps.
Using the idea of the general three-party QSS scheme,
we construct our main protocol known as quantum se-
quential transmission protocol under the security param-
eter ε. The parameter ε implies that security and ef-
ficiency of the protocols are dealt with an asymptotic
consideration. Shortly speaking, the quantum sequential
transmission protocol can transmit any quantum states
from one party to another under the consent of all au-
thorized participants with classical secret bits. Note that
any input quantum states into a quantum channel are
arbitrary quantum information with a given dimension,
and we exclude classical information. Thus we expect
that the protocol, QST, can be applied to certain ap-
plications such as quantum repeater [6], quantum key
repeater [7], quantum sealed-bid auction [8] or quantum
email protocol, since only authorized users can send, con-
firm, and read the quantum message. Furthermore, with
the proposed schemes, we study the key question of find-
ing minimal resources required to split and reconstruct a
quantum state, and to transfer arbitrary quantum infor-
mation sequentially.
Let us briefly review the quantum one-time pad or pri-
vate quantum channel (PQC). Ambainis et al. [9] first
proposed a quantum primitive known as a private quan-
tum channel for secure transmission of quantum states,
and already proved its security including the optimal-
ity [10, 11]. The complete randomization method natu-
rally gave births to approximate approaches for random-
izing quantum states [12–14]. We here adopt an approx-
imate version of the Dickinson and Nayak’s PQC [14],
which has relatively few Pauli operations on multi-qubit
encodings. Using conventions and definitions in Sec. I A,
we construct a quantum communication protocol that
are efficient and secure with a small information leak-
ages (ε  1) notwithstanding minimal use of resources.
But, in this paper, we mainly focus our attention on
constructing the mathematical structure of the ε-secure
quantum sequential transmission scheme (QST).
Before finishing the section, we introduce the basic con-
cept of (approximate) PQC or ε-randomizing map (or
also known as random unitary channel). Moreover we
comment on security analysis from Holevo bound and the
correspondence between (classical) keys and Pauli opera-
tions. In Section II, we focus on our main construction of
quantum sequential transmission protocol, which is one
step more advanced form of the well-known three-party
QSS, on multi-party system. In Section III, we summa-
rize and conclude our work.
A. Background
For a given d-dimensional Hilbert space Cd, B(Cd) de-
notes the space of bounded linear operators on the space
Cd, and U(d) ⊂ B(Cd) the unitary group on the space.
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2We make use of a quantum map from B(Cd) to itself gen-
erally known as a quantum channel. Then we can define
a private quantum channel: For any ε ≥ 0, a completely
positive and trace preserving (CPTP) map R : B(Cd)→
B(Cd) is said to be ε-randomizing with respect to the
trace norm if, for all quantum state ρ ∈ B(Cd),∥∥∥∥R(ρ)− 1dd
∥∥∥∥
1
≤ ε, (1)
where 1d denotes the identity matrix of a given dimension
d. The input quantum source ρ is a d-dimensional den-
sity matrix. The map R satisfying Eq. (1) is the approx-
imate private quantum channel (APQC), and ‖M‖1 :=
tr
√
M†M denotes the trace norm for any matrixM . Note
that the mapping R is perfect (or complete) randomizing
map if ε = 0. The definition with the security param-
eter ε always implies perfect PQC, and gives us the in-
formational security rather than a security based on the
computational complexity.
A simple way to create such an invertible encoding
map is to choose a certain sequence of unitary operators
U1, . . . , Us≤d2 ∈ U(d) and define the encoding map as
R : ρ→ 1
s
s∑
i=1
UiρU
†
i . (2)
The index i corresponds to the number of shared secret
bits that all communicating parties share. We here as-
sume that the secret bits are unknown to any eavesdrop-
pers or unauthorized parties. With a suitable choice of
s unitary operators not more than d2, the mapping R
satisfies to be an approximate private quantum channel.
In fact, any orthogonal set of d2 unitary operations form
a perfect private quantum channel. Notice that the di-
mension d of our case is fixed to 2n to accommodate the
Hilbert space of n qubits.
If that is the case, how can we analyze the security of
approximate private quantum channels? Roughly speak-
ing, the accessible information to any attackers, for any
quantum states ρ =
∑
i piρi supported on Cd and dε < 1,
is bounded above by Holevo information [15]
χ{pi,R(ρi)} = S
(
d∑
i=1
piR(ρi)
)
−
d∑
i=1
piS(R(ρi))
≤ log(1 + dε) < dε,
where {pi,R(ρi)} represents an ensemble of ρi’s with
probability pi’s through the quantum channel R, and
S(ρ) := −trρ log ρ, the von Neumann entropy. The
above inequality is true because the definition of the
ε-randomizing map with respect to the trace norm in
Eq. (1) implies that the eigenvalues of the channel-output
are almost uniformly distributed such that R(ρi) '
(1 + dε)1d/d. This also means that attackers cannot
obtain any information about the information of the en-
semble {pi,R(ρi)} under the condition dε < 1.
Finally, a relation between keys and Pauli operators is
crucial in the proof of following protocol, so we carefully
investigate the key correspondence. An explicit construc-
tion for Eq. (2) depends on unitary operators chosen at
random from the set of n-qubit Pauli matrices. For two
n-bit strings a and b, let a ∗ b = ∑nj=1 ajbj mod 2 de-
notes the standard inner product on Zn2 . We represent
a tensor product of n single qubit Pauli operators by a
string of 2n-bit K, (a, b) ∈ {0, 1}2n, by using the follow-
ing correspondence
K = (a, b) : ιa∗bXaZb, (3)
where XaZb = Xa1Zb1⊗· · ·⊗XanZbn with X =
(
0 1
1 0
)
and Z =
(
1 0
0 −1
)
, and ι =
√−1 the imaginary number.
Now, we define a set Pn as{
ιa∗bXaZb : (a, b) ∈ {0, 1}2n} ⊂ U(2n)
for all tensor products of n single qubit Pauli operators.
Then the set Pn forms a basis for the 2
n × 2n complex
matrices. (Note that the set P1 = {12, X, ιXZ,Z} is
the usual Pauli operators on single qubit.) For conve-
nience we substitute Pn to PK under the correspondence
in Eq. (3) to emphasize a classical key K.
As we mentioned above, n-qubit Pauli operators form
a basis for the set of all 2n× 2n matrices. So, for a given
density matrix ρ, we can construct that
ρ =
1
2n
∑
(a,b)∈{0,1}2n
ca,bX
aZb, (4)
where ca,b is an element of a vector (ca,b) in C2
n
with
‖ca,b‖22 ≤ 2n, and ‖X‖2 :=
√
trX†X is the Frobenius (or
Hilbert-Schmidt) norm on the space.
II. QUANTUM SEQUENTIAL TRANSMISSION
SCHEME
With additional modification of QSS [1, 16, 17] and
approximate private quantum channels, we now propose
a quantum transmission protocol of so-called ε-secure
quantum sequential transmission (QST) scheme. The
main objective of our task is to send a unknown quan-
tum information from a sender to a receiver when sev-
eral authorized intermediate nodes exist. Although the
quantum information is transmitted sequential ways on
concatenated quantum channels, the crucial advantage
of this protocol is to preserving its explicit security and
efficiency. In the sequential structure, we take the gener-
alized n-qubit Pauli commutation relations on any input
quantum signal, and prove the mathematical consistency
and security of the chained ε-randomizing maps.
As in three-party QSS protocol, suppose that, for all
i-th position, Alice, Bob and Charlie share a correlation
3PP P P P
R
KA1 KAmKA2
1E R mER 2E R m-1E
ρ ρ
KA1 KA2 KA3 KAm-1 KAm
KA4 = 0i
i=1
m
FIG. 1: Approximate m-party quantum sequential transmis-
sion protocol: By using a secret classical information K, a
sender transmits any quantum state ρ securely to final node
through the m − 1 and ε-randomizing maps REj for all j.
Boxes with PK represent the n-qubit Pauli operations corre-
sponding a key K.
key such that kAi ⊕ kBi ⊕ kCi = αi mod 2, where αi is
fixed to 0 under the mod 2 operation. The main purpose
of this protocol is to securely transmit a quantum state
from Alice to Charlie through a middle party Bob. The
transmitted state between Alice and Charlie is asymptot-
ically secure since the 2n-bit-key-based PQC makes ar-
bitrary n-qubit state into a near maximally mixed state
(in three-party scenario). Extending the idea of three-
party protocol, we can directly generalize it to an m-
party concatenated-transmission protocol within n-qubit
Pauli commutation relations.
First, we simply take account of three-party protocol
for sequential quantum state transmission. Alice pre-
pares an n-qubit quantum state |Φ〉 ∈ B(C2n) and en-
codes the state to PKA |Φ〉 which will be transmitted to
Bob. (Consideration of only pure states is enough since
the convexity of trace norm ensures the previous state-
ment.) Bob also encodes the state, by using the cor-
relation key KB , to PKB ◦ PKA |Φ〉 where ◦ denotes a
composition of two Pauli sets, and sends the state to the
third party Charlie. Remember that kAi ⊕ kBi ⊕ kCi = αi,
so the receiver Charlie efficiently decodes the state to
original quantum information
PKC ◦ PKB ◦ PKA |Φ〉 = |Φ〉 . (5)
In Eq. (5), we use the following identity, for any Pauli
operators,
PKC ◦ PKB ◦ PKA = PKC⊕KB⊕KA mod 2 = P0 := 12n .
(6)
This condition for (complete) private quantum channel
needs exactly 2n secret bits. But if we use the approxi-
mate case of PQC, then we need about half-size (≈ n-bit)
keys only instead of 2n-bit keys [12, 14], i.e., for suffi-
ciently large d it satisfies our security level with small
ε.
As shown in Fig. 1, m-party extension (m ≥ 3) of QST
scheme is simple and natural, but we need some technical
calculations as shown below. We note that every inter-
mediate user also accomplishes the role of sender and
receiver. Before describing the m-party scenario, we de-
fine a bias of a set of 2n-bit strings. For a given subset
of E ⊂ {0, 1}2n, if
Bias(E, (a, b)) =
∣∣∣Ex∈E(−1)x∗(a,b)∣∣∣ , (7)
then we call the set E is biased with respect to a string
(a, b) ∈ {0, 1}2n [14, 18], where E is an expectation value
for some variable in E. Note that ∗ is also the inner
product, and the bias is equal to 2EE [x∗(a, b)]−1 under
the modulo 2 operations. When, for all (a, b) 6= 02n,
Bias(E, (a, b)) ≤ β, we call the subset E ⊂ {0, 1}2n to
be β-biased.
A subset E ⊂ {0, 1}2n defines a CPTP map on n-qubit
as follows,
RE(ρ) = 1|E|
∑
(u,v)∈E
XuZvρZvXu
=
1
2n|E|
∑
(u,v),(a,b)
ca,bX
uZv(XaZb)ZvXu
=
1
2n
∑
(a,b)∈{0,1}2n
ca,bβa,bX
aZb, (8)
where a real number |βa,b| is equal to the Bias(E, (a, b))
in Eq. (7). The modulus of E, |E|, corresponds to some
number s(≤ 22n) of n-qubit Pauli operations used in the
map RE . By using commutation relations on Pauli ma-
trices, above equations can be derived from
XuZv(XaZb)ZvXu = (−1)a∗v+b∗uXaZb (9)
=: βa,bX
aZb.
If we choose E = {0, 1}2n, then we have a completely
randomizing map. It is known that there exists a map
RE an ε-randomizing map with respect to the trace norm
for n-qubit states, when the subset E ⊂ {0, 1}2n be a
set with bias at most ε · 2−n/2. (See also the proof in
Ref. [13].)
From the existence of small β-bised subset E, the
Frobenius norm of the randomized state is almost con-
centrated at the maximally mixed state, that is,
‖RE(ρ)‖22 ≤
1 + ε2
2n
. (10)
This inequality can be directly calculated from the
Eq. (8) of ε·2−n/2-biasedness and the bound ‖ca,b‖22 ≤ 2n.
Moreover, for any density matrix N ∈ B(C2n), the
inequalities ‖N‖1 ≤
√
2n · ‖N‖2 and
∥∥N − 12n2n ∥∥21 ≤
2n · ‖N‖22 − 1 always hold. (See proof details in the ap-
pendix A of Ref. [14].) Thus we obtain the following
chain bounds∥∥∥∥RE(ρ)− 12n2n
∥∥∥∥
1
≤
√
2n‖RE(ρ)‖22 − 1 ≤ ε. (11)
Thus, if we can choose a suitable subset E with β-
biasedness, then we can always create ε-randomizing map
or APQC in trace norm. The above equation, Eq. (11),
4is intrinsically identical to the Eq. (1), therefore the se-
curity is well preserved.
Finally we show that multi-party approximate private
quantum channel and multi-party quantum sequential
transmission protocol is secure and efficient, i.e., we claim
that nDN := n + 2 log
1
ε + 4 classical keys are sufficient
for the m-party QST scheme. By choosing a dense subset
E, we can initialize a subset Ej ⊂ {0, 1}2n to be a set
with bias at most ε1/m · 2−n/2m for each j [19]. Then we
assert that there exists an m-party ε-randomizing map
with respect to the trace norm for n-qubit states: For
any density matrix ρ ∈ B(C2n), we have
∥∥∥∥REm ◦ REm−1 ◦ · · · ◦ RE1(ρ)− 12n2n
∥∥∥∥
1
≤ ε. (12)
We here denote that RT = REm ◦ · · · ◦ RE1 for conve-
nience. Since the m-user encoding and transmitting for
a quantum state under m-APQC form an m-party QST
protocol, and it can be directly derived from the following
commutation relation
XumZvm · · · (Xu1Zv1(XaZb)Zv1Xu1) · · ·ZvmXum = (−1)
∑m
j=1 a∗vj+b∗ujXaZb. (13)
This equation is just a generalization of Eq. (9). Sup-
pose that, for every quantum state ρ ∈ B(C2n), each
ε-randomizing map between two nodes (j, j + 1) satisfies∥∥∥∥Rj(ρ)− 12n2n
∥∥∥∥
1
≤ ε 1m , (14)
then we can always construct multi-user QST protocol
via approximate private quantum channels with∥∥∥∥RT (ρ)− 12n2n
∥∥∥∥
1
≤ ε, (15)
and consume about n bits of secret classical keys satisfy-
ing
⊕m
i=1K
Ai = 0. This result implies that QST based
on sequential private quantum channels is secure. The
estimation of Eq. (15) for every ε promises to use the
classical key of n+2 log 1ε +4 bits [14]. Notice that Dick-
inson and Nayak’s efficient construction for the approx-
imate PQC on n-qubit situation relies on McDiarmid’s
inequality in probability analysis and a net argument on
discretizing pure quantum states. Strict security analy-
sis for the approximate private quantum channel in se-
curity parameter ε are reported at Ref. [11], and see also
Ref. [20].
III. CONCLUSION
In summary, we constructed a quantum communica-
tion protocol for quantum sequential and ε-secure trans-
mission scheme via the extension of three-party QSS task.
This scheme makes use of a relatively small (correlated)
classical secret information of about nDN ' n bits, just
half of the size or the perfect private quantum channel
of 2n-bit, and transmit any n-qubit states securely, so
we say that the protocol is efficient. The security argu-
ment only depends on the small security parameter ε in
which an approximate private quantum channel guaran-
tee its security. In fact, it is a small value (ε < 1) for
sufficiently large d-dimension of Hilbert space Cd.
Beyond the mathematical construction of the quantum
sequential transmission scheme, we need to exploit this
type of communication protocols for potential future ap-
plications such as quantum (key) repeater, auction, and
email scheme and so on. So, the analysis of these proto-
cols in quantum regime is significant and necessary. We
finally point out that the security of the QST protocol
must be systematically analyzed for several cases of at-
tackers, and further study is needed for mathematical
generalization in p-norm cases (for all p > 1). We hope
that the quantum sequential transmission, QST, can be
used for the realization of practical quantum communi-
cation networks.
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